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Abstract
This study examines the dispute of South Korea’s ban on Japanese fishery 
imports since the Fukushima nuclear crisis in March, 2011, up to the Japanese 
government’s complaints to WTO and the final dispute outcome in April, 2019 in 
view of the policy implementation theory. Without a clear perception of who 
should be protected, and what should be done, the South Korean government’s 
response had drifted from the beginning and the situation was further exacerbated 
by the conflict among stakeholders at every moment of crisis in the policy process. 
Although Korean government won a dramatic victory in the final trial, the question 
remains why the dispute, which could have been ended in the first trial, lasted. The 
results of the analysis through Richard Matland’s ambiguous-conflict matrix are as 
follows. First, the Korean government, which must protect the public health and 
safety from radioactively-contaminated Japanese fisheries, failed to find a 
consistent policy goal throughout the dispute process. Second, in the midst of a 
policy drift, conflicts between the central government and the government-
consumer group emerged, as well as a diplomatic conflict with Japan. As a result, 
over the past eight years, the Korean government went through a process of semi-
experimental implementation → political implementation → symbolic 
implementation. The South Korean government’s defeat in the first trial was a 
foreseeable outcome. The Korean government did not fully understand the 
international norms and had given up the opportunity to learn from past policy 
mistakes. Although the related ministries should have discussed the problem head-
to-head, the implementation process of the ban on imports shows that each had 
different agendas. Finally, the study draws policy implications for better managing 
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future disputes in dealing with similar cases.1
Keyword: Nuclear accident, World Trade Organization(WTO), SPS agreement, 
provisional measure, ambiguity-conflict model
Student Number: 2017-28187
                                                  
1 This thesis builds upon and further validates author's manuscript entitled "South 
Korea’s Import Ban on Japanese Fishery Products: What Went Wrong and What 
Went Right?" (co-authored with Min Gyo Koo).
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Chapter 1. Introduction
In March, 2011, a 9.0-magnitude earthquake on Japan’s north-eastern coast 
caused an explosion in Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP), 
resulting in a radiation leak. The Korean government immediately banned imports 
of more than 50 fishery products from eight provinces, including Fukushima. 
Furthermore, in September 2013, additional actions were taken to ban imports of 
all fishery products from eight provinces nearby Fukushima. In June, 2015, Japan 
filed complaints to World Trade Organization (WTO) and requested consultation 
with Korea under the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitory (SPS committee). 
After failing to reach an agreement, Japan requested the establishment of a panel, 
arguing that Korea’s imports ban is beyond the international standards and is not 
based on scientific risk assessment, therefore it has infringed the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitory Measures (SPS). The South Korean government, 
however, contendeds that the measure was reasonable not only because it followed 
the provisional measure under Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, but also because its 
geographic proximity to Japan could bring significant damage through 
radioactively contaminated food.
WTO panel report, released on February 22, 2018, concluded that the Korean 
government’s ban on imports of Japanese fisheries in 2011 and 2013, was 
reasonable but a continued measure was in violation of the SPS Agreement. The 
panel focused on the fact that South Korea did not collect additional information 
and did not conduct a continuous reassessment.2 The panel also ruled against 
Korea because Korea requested additional inspections only to Japanese fisheries 
                                                  
2 In fact, Korea’s ‘Committee of Japan Radioactive Safety Management’ abruptly stopped 
its research activities in June, 2015, after Japan’s complaint to WTO. 
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products, maintained more stringent trade measures than necessary, and did not 
provide sufficient information on trade restrictions(WT/DS495). 3 What is 
important here is that the panel had been watching the South Korean government’s 
every move. In other words, each policy measure and the entire process of its 
execution played a decisive role in the panel decision. Thus, no government policy 
with regards to trade issues is free from international norms.
After the reporting of panel ruling in Korea, criticism of the outcome and the 
government’s poor response was brought against the Korean government. The 
defeat in Korea was somewhat expected in that the initial steps and follow-up 
responses of the Korean government were poor. But there remain several 
unanswered questions. Why did Korea a leader in trade and foreign affairs, 
responded so poorly? Why had the import ban, a policy means to achieve the 
policy goal of public health and food safety, drifted?
Korea-Japan fisheries dispute is no different than any other trade dispute, as the 
complaint was filed in accordance with the dispute settlement body set by WTO 
against the importer’s import ban. However, not only was it rare for imports of 
radioactively contaminated marine products to be an issue, but it was the first time 
that this issue became a trade dispute at the WTO under the SPS Agreement. The 
Korean government, which was an import-regulated country and in the position of 
a defendant, had difficulty setting sub-policy goals and policy tools despite its clear 
top-level policy goals of protecting the health and food safety for the people. 
Furthermore, conflicts among stakeholders over policy tools worsened the policy 
drift.
                                                  
3 On April 9, 2018, South Korean government filed an appeal against a WTO panel report. 
However, it is likely to be a tough fight that Korea has already been defeated and has not 
provided enough information. The regulations require final outcome within three months 
from the date of appeal, but it is expected to take longer because some members of the 
appeals committee have been vacant recently.
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There has been a lot of academic discussions on the topic at hand since March, 
2011 when the first import ban was implemented. Most studies, however, have 
limited the interpretation and application of the SPS Agreements related to 
quarantine sovereignty, the impact of radiation risks on consumers’ consumption 
behavior, and the food sector radioactive management system. None of the papers 
analyzed the issue in terms of the policy enforcement theory. Moreover, there are 
few studies in domestic policy studies that deal with this issue academically.
This study begins with a sense of the problem that since the dispute between 
Korea and Japan was a problem that occurred in the process of implementing 
import bans, the execution process must be analyzed in order to understand trade 
disputes and the decision. The reason why the same claim showed different results 
in the first and final trial was because of the Korean government’s abrupt response 
without a clear perception of who should be protect from whom. In other words, 
the ban on Japanese fishery products drifted from the beginning and thus 
aggravated rather than solved the problem. Furthermore, the study argues that 
conflicts between stakeholders at every process also affected the policy drift. This 
study proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 analyzes issues related to the SPS Agreement, introduces the 
principles of panel rulings, and provides a brief overview of the Korean 
government’s legal response and logic. And Matland’s ambiguity-conflict model is 
reconstructed to analyze the Korean government’s response process in view of the 
policy implementation theory. The Matland model, which provides a typology of 
policy implementation by looking at goal ambiguity and conflicts as key variables, 
is suitable for analyzing the type of policy change and process in an integrated 
perspective, taking into account both the downward factors (policy goal ambiguity) 
and the upward factors (conflicts among stakeholders). The purpose of this study is 
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to explain why Korean government’s policy drifted, despite the opportunities to 
correct and compensate policy errors during the process of implementation. 
Section 3 finds that the imports ban dispute underwent three sequential stages 
from March, 2011 to April, 2019. The first stage, from March, 2013 to July, 2013, 
can be classified as a semi-experimental implementation in that the Korean 
government simply followed the Japanese government’s initial quarantine 
measures without a proper understanding of the effects of radioactive 
contamination on marine products. This was followed by a political 
implementation in the period from July, 2013 to May, 2015 because the Korean 
government implemented strong ban on the import of Japanese marine product 
after rumors of radiation leaks spread. Moreover, the Korean government was in 
the face of conflicts within the government ministries and an opposition from the 
Japanese government. Finally, after June, 2015, when Japan’s complaint to WTO 
challenged to the Korean government’s previous ban on imports, the Korean 
government went into limbo again. This period is classified as a symbolic 
implementation in that the Korean government maintained the import ban due to 
public opinion gripped by fears of radioactive contamination, but did not take 
measures to support it both substantively and normatively. 
Finally, Section 4 summarizes the analysis results and draws policy 
implications for better dealing with similar cases.
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Chapter 2. Theoretical Background and Analysis 
Frame
2.1 Significance of the SPS Agreement and its main contents
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947-system exceptionally 
allows members’ import regulation to protect health of human and animal under 
the 20th section(b). As the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) emerged as an issue 
for major trading countries, the plurilateral TBT Agreement called Standard Code 
was adopted in the Tokyo Round, 1964-79, and it deals with requirements for food 
safety and sanitary measures of flora and fauna. Under the 1979 TBT convention, 
signatories could not follow technical measures on trade when international 
standards could not protect their hygiene. However, the treaty did not reach 
multilateral agreements because it only applied to countries that ratified the treaty. 
Later, in Uruguay Round, 1986-93, the need for multilateral discipline of the SPS 
measures was raised, and agreed based on the draft of Dunkel Text inn 1991, then 
in effect after 1st January, 1995(Goo and Choi, 2019)
   Although the SPS Agreement explicitly acknowledges that members have 
the right to take measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health 
(SPS Article 2.1), it could not be applied in a way which would constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade (Article 2.3). The SPS Agreement 
emphasizes that it should be based on scientific evidence and shall not be 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence (Article 2.2).
   The guidance that scientific evidence is particularly important is Article 5, 
which sets out assessment of risk and determination of the appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection. The Article 1 considers that members could 
ensure their SPS measures by taking risk assessment techniques developed by the 
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relevant international organizations and by taking into account available scientific 
evidence (Article 5.2). In assessing the risk, members shall take into account as 
relevant economic factors: the potential damage about loss of production or sales, 
the costs of control, and the relative cost-effectiveness (Article 5.3), and as the 
objective of minimizing negative trade effects (Article 5.4). Member shall avoid 
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in 
different situations. (Article 5.5) and ensure that the measures are not more trade-
restrictive than required (Article 5.6).
   WTO does not recognize officially law the precautionary principle of 
general international law that can take in the case that scientific evidence is 
insufficient but severs damage is expected. However, Article 5.7 allows temporary 
measure to be taken when there is a concern of serious damage although scientific 
evidence is insufficient. In this case, four requirements are required to take 
provisional measure: (1) adopted in respect of a situation where relevant scientific 
evidence is insufficient, (2) imposed on the basis of available pertinent information, 
(3) accumulates the additional evidence necessary for a more objective as risk 
assessment, (4) reviews the measure within a reasonable period of time. If any of 
these four requirements were not held to be cumulative, the provisional measure 
shall not be taken (Goo and Choi, 2019).
   Japan claimed that Korea’s import ban is inconsistent with Article 2.3 
because Korea arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminated Japanese products by 
constituting a disguised restriction on international trade. Moreover, Korean 
government failed to comply with the transparency requirement in Article 7. In 
response, Korea responded that import ban was not only a temporary measure 
under Article 5.7, but also considered the possibility of greater damage to 
radioactive contaminated food from geographic proximity to Japan.
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2.2 Matland’s Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix
It is necessary to understand the interpretation and application of the Korean 
government’s SPS Agreement on import ban of Japanese fisheries products and to 
accurately understand the decision made by the dispute settlement system, in 
particular the interim measures of Article 5.7. Above all, the ambiguity of the 
policy goal is at the back of the Korean government’s current ban on import since 
its beginning in 2011. In addition, multi-stage conflict structure composed of 
Korean central government, civic group, consumer and Japanese government 
contributed to the policy change. 
   Research on legal interpretation of the SPS Agreement (Gang, 2013; Jung, 
2013; Ryu, 2015) and consumer studies/food awareness of radioactive risks to 
domestic consumers (Lee, 2011; Deok He, et al, 2013; Hwang and Lee, 2014; Kim 
and Baek, 2016; Kim and Kang, and Kwon, 2016; Jang and Kim, 2016; Joo and 
Yoo, 2016; Ha and Song, 2016; Lee and Ko, 2017; Kim, 2018) abounds. But few 
studies have analyzed this issue from the perspective of policy formation, decision 
making and execution process.
In response, this study seeks to overcome the limitations of existing research by 
reorganizing the dispute between Korea and Japan from the perspective of policy 
implementation by combining discussions on goal ambiguity and policy conflict. 
To achieve this purpose, Matland’s policy implementation model provides a useful 
framework for analysis (Cohen, et. Al, 2005; Ellis, 2015).
  Matland presented a model of the policy implementation process on the 
basis of two factors: ambiguity of policy goal and conflict among interest group. A 
low level of ambiguity and conflict means administrative implementation, a high 
level of ambiguity and conflict means symbolic implementation, a high level of 
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ambiguity and low level of conflict means experimental implementation and a low 
level of ambiguity and high level of conflict means political implementation.

















   First, administrative implementation has the purpose and technical means 
for solving problem, so the outcome of the policy depends on the availability and 
degree of resources necessary for policy implementation. Because administrative 
implementation is less ambiguous and less contentious, it develops normative 
means and standard operating process to stratify tasks. Thus, a relatively stable 
form of implementation can result in uniform implementation (Matland, 1995: 160-
163).
   Second, experimental implementation occurs in situations where policy 
goals are vague and means required to realize a policy is also uncertain. The 
outcome of the policy is determined by contextual conditions. In other words, there 
can be wide variety of outcomes depending on the actors and resources involved in 
policy implementation.
   Third, political implementation has low policy ambiguity but high level of 
conflicts among stakeholders who have different policy goals and means, therefore, 
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the policy is determined by power relationships. There is a tendency to be heavily 
influenced by external actors, and there is no choice but to gain support and reach 
agreement through forceful means (Matland, 1995: 163-165).
   Fourth, symbolic implementation occurs when policy goals are vague and 
the level of conflict is high. The power relationship controls the outcome of 
implementation, but unlike political implementation, there are various 
interpretations of policy means due to the high ambiguity of the policy goals. 
Therefore, the role of the experts about the interpretation is important. The results 
of implementation are affected by the power relationships of the unions formed by 
stakeholders (Matland, 1995: 168-170).
   The above-mentioned model of Matland has the advantage of 
systematically classifying the types of policy implementation according to the 
degree of ambiguity in policy and conflicts among stakeholders about policy means.
However, in the Matland model, the goal ambiguity is focused on the ambiguity of 
the unit of policy, so there is a limitation as an analytical framework when various 
organizations participate in, and each unit of organization has goal ambiguity 
(Jensen, et. al, 2017). In addition, since Matland does not present specific factors 
that determine the level of conflict, additional factors are needed to be used as an 
analytical framework for this study. Thus, in this study, goal ambiguity theory is 
used to expand and reinterpret the model of Matland, and for identifying conflict 
levels, the model conceptualization needs to be improved by understanding the 
relationship among stakeholders about the policy goal and means.4
                                                  
4 It is pointed out that, in theory, there can be a multicollinearity issue between ambiguity 
and conflict levels, which are independent variables of Matland model. Matland also 
explained that since conflicts tend to decrease because of the higher level of ambiguity in 
the policy goal, ambiguity in the policy goal can generally be proportional to the level of 
conflict (Matland, 1995: 158). Further analysis of the correlation between ambiguity and 
conflict is required, taking into account the probability of multicollinearity (Seo and Goo, 
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2.3 Analysis framework
1. Ambiguity in policy goal
A single situation can be perceived in different ways (Feldman, 1989: 5), which 
means there are competitive interpretations to a situation (Chun, 2004b: 3). In this 
regard, when a number of different interpretations are possible, the goals of the 
organization are lost meaning and ambiguous (DiMaggio, 1987; Feldman, 1989; 
Kelemen, 2000; Chun and Rainey, 2005; Lee, Rainey and Chun, 2010; Jung, 2014). 
Chun and Rainey (2005) develop four dimensions of goal ambiguity: mission 
comprehension ambiguity, directive goal ambiguity, evaluative goal ambiguity, 
and priority goal ambiguity to explain which goals in organization make 
competitive interpretation.
   First, mission comprehension ambiguity refers to the number of competitive 
interpretation that occurs in understanding, explaining, and communicating the 
mission of an organization. The easier to understand and communicate the mission, 
the less diverse interpretations become, so the leaders of organizations strive to 
enhance member’s commitment and sense of mission (Chun, 2004a: 55).
   Second, directive goal ambiguity refers to the number of competitive 
interpretation in translating an organization’s mission into specific directives (Chun, 
2004a: 55). For instance, because of ambiguous terms in the law, it is difficult for 
public officials to draw clear guidelines for action in the policy implementation 
process (Lerner and Wanat, 1983).
   Third, evaluative goal ambiguity refers to the number of competitive 
interpretations in assessing how far organizations have achieved their mission 
(Chun and Rainey, 2005). When evaluating organizational performance, the goal 
                                                                                                                           
2014: 151).
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need to be transformed into performance indicators (Grizzle, 1982). But when 
organizations lack objective performance indicators, they focus on workload-
oriented indicators rather than on performance indicators (Merton, 1957). As with 
other organizational goals, evaluation ambiguity is no an entirely new concept 
(Chun, 2004a; Chun and Rainey, 2005).
   Fourth, priority goal ambiguity is defined as the number of competitive 
interpretations that occur in determining the priority of a number of goals. 
Prioritizing means recognizing one goal is prioritized over another at a particular 
point in time or integrating the linkage of goal-means (Richards, 1986; Chun, 
2004).
   Research on factors affecting goal ambiguity has also emerged. Lee et al. 
(2009) focus on the political environment, suggesting that the higher the political 
salience of president, congress and the media, the more goal ambiguity increases. 
Jung (2009) attempted to study the impact factors of the goal ambiguity of a policy 
project as a unit of analysis, and argued that management capabilities, project types, 
assessment years, project scale, budget growth, political partisanship, and 
institutional type influence goal ambiguity at a statistically significant level. This 
study focuses on political, administrative, and business characteristics factors noted 
by Kwon Tae-wook and Chun Young-han (2015) that affect goal ambiguity.
   First, the complexity of political demands in political factors arises when 
the needs of various participants and competitive interests are put into the policy 
process. Because government policy project should meet the needs and 
expectations of external environments composed of various stakeholders (Meier, 
2000), the complexity of political needs can be viewed as an independent variable 
affecting ambiguity. Political attention is also a factor to consider, which increases 
the likelihood of political actors in the external environment of the organization, 
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such as president, congress and media, influence in policy goals (Lee et al., 2009: 
265). Moreover, political attention on each policy project would also have similar 
outcome (Kwon and Chun, 2015).
   Second, administrative factors are associated with planning activities to 
clearly set goals for the policy project (Jung, 2009: 79). The higher the planning 
ability, the more specific a set of target groups established and resources can be 
allocated according to the wishes of the respective departments (Kwon and Chun, 
2015: 173). In addition, the level of goal ambiguity many be reduced through 
management activities of assessment and structured relation of various actors 
involved in a financial management or policy project (Lee, 2006; Kwon and Chun, 
2015: 173).5
   Third, directness in business characteristics means whether government 
performs all roles exclusively or quasi-government or non-government institutions 
take over the executive duties (Chun, 2007). As the scale of policy projects 
increase, the functions and goals become more diverse. In addition, levels of 
ambiguity increase when budgets are rigid or without growth (Marginson and 
Ogden, 2005; Jung, 2009).
2. Conflicts between policy goals and means
In the concept of Matland (1995), conflict is largely an independent variable, 
but the exact concept of it is not addressed. Conflicts occur when there is no 
consensus on the distribution of limited or reciprocal resources between two or 
more individuals, groups, organizations, or communities (Brickman, 1974; Rubin 
et al., 1994; Plowman, 1995; Jung, 2010: 4). Policy conflicts, in particular, are 
                                                  
5 Scholars paying attention to public management leadership argue that managers and 
leaders have a significant impact on the level of goal ambiguity. This is because it is one of 
the administrator’s major responsibilities to clarify the goal or to present a level of 
achievement in specific performance (Jung, 2009).
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situations in which multiple stakeholders deal with policies that are directly related 
to their interests or collide when organizations disagree with them. This aspect of 
conflict is also associated with the means to implement policies, which also arise 
when different means are proposed to achieve the goals. For example, a reduction 
in environmental pollution may be an agreed-upon goal, but conflicts arise when 
stakeholder prefers different ways to implement this policy (Matland, 1995: 157). 
   Various levels of conflict arose among stakeholders in the fisheries dispute 
between Korea and Japan. Above all, Korea and Japan were at odds over their 
interests. Within South Korea, there were conflicts over different policy means 
between the ministries concerned, and socially there were conflicts between the 
government and the consumers. Therefore, in this study, we are going to examine 
conflicts between countries, within government, and finally between government 
and society in three stages, how each conflict with policy goals and means affected 
the policy implementation process.
   <Figure 1> shows the conceptual framework that analyzes the level of 
ambiguity in policy goals determined by political, administrative, and business 
factors, and how the level of policy conflict caused by differences in policy goals 
and means have affected policy implementation in the dispute between Korea and 
Japan.
Figure 1 Conceptual framework
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   The level of conflict over Korean government’s policy goals fluctuated 
greatly following the announcement of Japan’s July 2013 nuclear power plants 
crisis and the Japanese government’s complaints to WTO in June 2015. Therefore, 
the period is divided as follows: (1) March, 2011 (Fukushima nuclear accident) ~ 
July, 2013 (the announcement of the nuclear radiation leak), (2) July, 2013 ~ May, 
2015 (complaint to WTO), (3) June, 2015 (after Japan’s complaint to WTO) ~ 
Current. Process tracing method is used as an analysis method by utilizing the 
WTO panel reports, press release of Office for government policy coordination, 
Ministry of agriculture, food and rural affairs, Ministry of trade, industry and 
energy, Ministry of food and drug safety, Ministry of foreign affairs, Nuclear 
safety and security commission, and Ministry of ocean and fisheries. In addition, 
the paper seeks to increase the leverage of causal inference by conducting expert 
interviews directly or indirectly participating in the policy process to obtain 
information on context, process, and linkage mechanisms.6
                                                  
6 The interviews were conducted in March, 2018 with a former senior official at the 
Ministry of trade, who participated in the dispute, and a member of the civilian experts’ 
committee who reevaluated the feasibility of import regulations.
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Chapter 3. Analysis Results
3.1 Semi-experimental implementation: March, 2011 ~ July, 
2013
On March 11, 2011, a hydrogen explosion occurred in Fukushima 1 nuclear 
power plant due to the massive earthquake and tsunami in Japan, resulting in a 
radiation leak. Lee Myung-bak government immediately banned 50 of the imported 
fishing products in eight prefectures including Fukushima. Its ban mirrored 
restrictions imposed by Japan. However, the government’s initial response was 
passive. With the public increasingly uneased in March, 2012, Lee Myung-bak 
government dramatically enhanced standards for all Japanese food imports 
(Ministry of agriculture, food and rural affairs, 2012.03.29.). At this time, the 
Korean government had no clear perception of the objective and rationale for the 
ban other than its ambiguous policy goal of ensuring public health and food safety. 
Therefore, there was no conflict between ministries over policy means. At that time, 
there were no signs of conflict between the government and the private sector or 
with the Japanese government, as Korean consumers were also less anxious due to 
the government’s import ban.
   The theoretical model used in this study expects experimental trials in high 
level ambiguity and low level conflict situations. The experimental implementation 
is a situation in which the preferences of participants are ambiguous and the skills 
needed to implement the policy are uncertain. Policy results are determined by 
contextual conditions at hand, and strong uncertainty prevents each policy means 
from forming a framework. Sometimes policies are created first when there are no 
realistic means of enforcement due to widely supported causes. According to 
Matland, experimental implementation is done through uncertain decisions in 
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difficult situations, such as the trash can model (Matland, 1995: 166).
   In experimental implementation, it is difficult to implement because of the 
insufficient information and the imperfect environmental factors. Therefore, 
learning about policy goals and means is more important than making successful 
results. That’s why we can look at experimental implementation as an opportunity 
(Matland, 1995: 167). However, during this time, Korean government did not fully 
consider the goals and means. As a result, the lack of preparation at this time led to 
an overreaction in the next period and thus provided the Japanese government an 
excuse to file a WTO complaint. The opportunities for spontaneous learning that 
should have been fully utilized during this period was lost as Korea faced the need 
for involuntary learning after the WTO complaint. Thus, the moment was not an 
experimental one in the most accurate sense, but a semi-experimental 
implementation.
1. High-level policy goal ambiguity: mission comprehension 
ambiguity 
This period was marked by mission comprehension ambiguity. As the public 
increasingly became uneased about the radioactive food imports, Lee Myung-bak 
government should have concentrated on public safety and risk management. This 
is because they did not fully understand about the level of radioactive 
contamination of seawater caused by the nuclear fallout and its impact on the 
marine products. The goals and means of the proposed policy were also ambiguous. 
In the end, the Korean government was criticized for being passive in its behavior 
because they just followed the policy implemented by Japan, the country where the 
accident occurred, rather than actively developing policy options. In other words, 
50 items in eight prefectures that Lee Myung-bak government had banned 
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immediately were also banned by the Japan government from exporting. However, 
China and Taiwan responded more actively to all food products produced in 
respectively 10 and 5 prefectures after the radiation leak.7
After the nuclear crisis, Japan strengthened its own radiation standards for 
public health and safety. Then Lee Myung-bak government followed Japan’s 
radioactive Caesium standards from 370Bq/kg to 100Bq/kg. Other neighbor 
countries such as China, Taiwan and others immediately took active measures after 
the accident, but Korea, which is geographically closest to Japan, only followed 
Japan’s standards. Some media criticized the Korean government for being too 
cautious not to cause controversy over quarantine sovereignty, but soon languished 
because there was no clear rule of judgement (Jung, 2012). The government lacked 
management and ability to cope with the nuclear accident in neighboring countries, 
and failed to prepare measures for the safety of the people.
The Korean government’s response is typical of an experimental 
implementation. The government had to come up with some measures to protect 
the public health and safety from the marine products, but it did not fully 
understand the issue and accepted the Japanese government’s measures 
experimentally.
Lee Myung-bak government’s nuclear friendly policy is not completely 
irrelevant. On the day of the Fukushima nuclear power plant crisis, President Lee 
Myung-bak attended a groundbreaking ceremony for constructing a South Korean 
nuclear plant in the United Arab Emirate, and emphasized that Japan’s nuclear 
accident is an opportunity for Korea (Jeon, 2011). However, he was indifferent the 
                                                  
7 At the time of 2011 radiation leak, China administration banned imports of all food 
products produced by 10 prefectures of Japan, and Taiwan also did it (excluding alcohol 
beverages), including Fukushima, Ibaraki, Dokoku, Gumma and Chiba prefecture, and 
responded more safely to the danger situation as neighboring countries.
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growing public anxiety over the nuclear accident. In other words, there was no 
accurate perception and understanding of what to do and why it had to be done. 
Government should make all-out efforts to protect the safety of the people and 
try to secure public trust in a crisis. But the government at that time didn’t have the 
experience and expertise required to assess the leak’s impact on public health and 
safety, and failed to recognize what to do. For these reasons, this period showed 
high-level of ambiguity.
2. Low level of conflict
From the nuclear accident to July, 2013, Lee Myung-bak government and 
ministries responded passively. Ministry of agriculture, food and rural affairs 
focused on follow-up measures such as expanding the radiation inspection of 
Japanese marine products and strengthening control over the country of origin 
(Ministry of agriculture, food and rural affairs, 2011.03.15.; 2011.09.23.). Ministry 
of food and drug safety was passive because they only represented response and 
management trend about Japan radioactive accident, explanation of rumors, import 
prohibited marine products, and notice of radioactivity test results.8 Office for 
government policy coordination held a good safety policy committee and planned 
to serve as a control tower for food safety policies such as management of imported 
food (Office for government policy coordination, 2011.03.23.), but did not take any 
action before the issue of radiation leak. In March, 2012, Ministry of agriculture, 
food and rural affairs announced that it would strengthen the standard of 
radioactive cesium for all imported Japanese food products, but it was not much 
different from the measures the Japanese government implemented earlier. When 
                                                  
8 A press release of Ministry of food and drug safety
(http://www.mfds.go.kr/index.do?mid=1074)
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major problems such as radiation accidents occur, conflicts over the overlapping 
functions of related ministries, opinion difference in priorities, and decisions on 
how to implement are generally seen. However, there was no such conflicting 
situation within the Korean government. 
   The passive response of the related ministries is because of the green-
growth policy trend in Lee Myung-bak government. The government, stressing 
nuclear facilities as a new growth engine, put a lot of effort and national resources 
to build nuclear power plants in the Unites Arab Emirates. In this trend, Ministry of 
food and drug safety has taken only minimal steps for safety management. They 
were concerned that if the nuclear accident and food safety issues are highlighted, 
it would throw a wet blanket over the government’s nuclear friendly policy. In 
addition, after the change of government in January, 2013, administrative reform 
was delayed due to the delay of the initial government reorganization and ministry 
appointment process, and the vacuum of administration and the absence of ministry 
leadership made officials apathetic (Lee, 2013).
   The Korean government did not impose such aggressive import bans as 
China and Taiwan, and the diplomatic conflict between Korea and Japan did not 
occur because Korea only followed the standards and measures proposed by Japan. 
This is because a cautious approach prevailed in government. At that time, 
Ministry of foreign affairs and Ministry of agriculture, food and rural affairs said 
that strict import inspections could lead to trade friction between Korea and Japan, 
and therefore, import ban should be implemented carefully (Kang, 2011). Indeed, 
European Union (EU) strictly implemented import bans on the U.S. genetically 
modified organism (GMO) products and Hormone-treated beef due to public 
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unrest.9 In addition, in the case of China-U.S. poultry dispute, U.S. lost the case 
because they did not provide adequate evidence about risk.10
   In addition, although some media released the public voice about their 
concerns, consumer groups did not take significant actions.11 Despite the nuclear 
crisis, the government eased consumer anxiety with the minimal import ban which 
followed the standard of Japan.
3.2 Political implementation: July, 2013 ~ May, 2015
On July 22, 2013, Japan’s Tokyo Electric Power Corporation announced that 
contaminated water from nuclear power plant was flowing into the sea. It did not 
deny that highly concentrated radioactive contaminated water is flowing into the 
                                                  
9 The GMO dispute between U.S. and EU began in the late 1990s when EU strictly 
restricted U.S/ imports of GMOs. Under EU’s import ban, Europe’s share of U.S. corn 
imports fell from 86 percent in 1995 to 10 percent in 2000. United States and other GMO 
exporting countries, including United States, which suffered huge losses due to the EU’s 
import restriction, filed a complaint against WTO in May, 2003. EU claimed the measure 
was a temporary measure under Article 5.7 of SPS Agreement, but in November, 2006, the 
panel report rules that EU is taking illegal import bans on GMOs because of lack of 
scientific evidence and risk assessment results. A similar ruling was made in the beef 
dispute between U.S. and EU ahead of the ruling. The panel, which was set up to resolve 
the conflict, recommended lifting EU’s ban on U.S. hormone imports, because there was no 
scientific evidence to raise the issue on the stability of beef infected with growth hormones
in 1997. EU appealed immediately, but in January, 1998, the appellate body ruled in favor 
of the panel’s decision. In 2005, EU filed a complaint with WTO against both United States 
and Canada in that their retaliatory tariffs were illegal. In October, 2008, appellate body 
made a vague ruling that EU could continue to ban imports of certain hormone beef while 
allowing U.S. and Canada to continue to impose retaliatory tariffs (Goo and Choi, 2019).
10 In 2004, several countries, including United States and China, banned poultry, including 
chicken, from being imported due to the spread of bird flu worldwide. Months later, China 
lifted the ban, but U.S. continued to maintain restrictions on import from China. China 
demanded WTO panel set up in June, 2009, and the panel report adopted in October, 2010 
ruled that U.S. did not provide a risk assessment and maintained import restrictions without 
scientific evidence which infringed Article 5.1, 5.2, and 2.2. It also ruled that U.S. claims 
that Chinese poultry is more dangerous than other WTO member’s products have been 
violated in that it is arbitrary and discriminatory (WT/DS392/R).
11 Conservative media such as Chosun, Joongang, Dong-A, and progressive newspaper like 
Hangyoreh, Kyunghyang voiced the public concerns voer radioactive-contaminated 
Japanese marine products.
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ocean and may have flowed into the Pacific Ocean (Nam, 2013). Public unease and 
concern increased because of Korea’s geographic proximity to Japan and Park 
Geun-hye government announced a ‘temporary special measures’ to strengthen the 
ban on fish imports on September, 6 with Ministry of foreign affairs, Ministry of 
security and public administration, Ministry of ocean and fisheries, Ministry of 
agriculture, food and rural affairs, Ministry of food and drug safety, Nuclear safety 
and security commission. It banned the import of all marine products from eight 
prefectures around Fukushima, and required other nuclear test to trace amounts of 
radioactive materials such as cesium or iodine found in Japanese food, and 
strengthened the criteria for detection of cesium. Park Geun-hye government had 
clear goals to totally ban imports of Japanese fisheries products at that time. 
However, it was not the result of a systematic learning from previous experience, 
but the result of external events such as the leak of contaminated water from 
nuclear power plant and the deterioration of domestic public opinion. Therefore, 
the implementation of this period was influenced by political motivation from the 
start. Moreover, political phenomenon of policy implementation accelerated as 
conflicts arose not only between Seoul and Tokyo but also among related 
ministries over the strict import restrictions.
   This period is characterized by ‘political implementation’. Political 
implementation occurs when actors have different policy goals and policy means, 
but in the end, the outcome of the policy is determined by the relationship of power. 
During this period, political focus of the issue was raised due to the influence of 
domestic public opinion, which was reflected in the implementation process.
1. Low-level of policy goal ambiguity
With the Japanese government’s announcement of a nuclear leak, radioactive 
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contamination became a big issue both domestically and abroad. People’s anxiety 
was amplified and media reports were critical. Political attention was raised also 
because it is an issue directly related to health. As political and media attention 
increased due to bad public opinion, Park Geun-hye government started to have 
strong and clear goals. Mission comprehension ambiguity of the previous period 
was greatly reduced with clear goal to secure public health and safety. The Korean 
government made efforts to ease public anxiety, including expanding inspections 
on food safety. Nuclear safety and security commission periodically announced the 
results of the radioactive environmental inspection, and Ministry of ocean and 
fisheries also expanded the disclosure of the radiation safety survey and 
strengthened crackdown on its origin. In September, 2013, a temporary special 
measure was taken to prohibit the import of all marine products from the eight 
prefectures around Fukushima after a meeting of related ministers, including 
Ministry of agriculture, food and rural affairs, Ministry of food and drug safety,
Ministry of foreign affairs, Ministry of security and public administration, Nuclear 
safety and security commission, Ministry of ocean and fisheries. They also decided 
to require additional verified certification for other types of nuclear tests if a small 
amount of cesium is found in marine or livestock products outside the eight 
prefectures. The inspection criteria for domestic food products also followed 
Japan’s elevated standards following the nuclear accident (Ministerial meeting, 
2013.09.06.). After the implementation of temporary special measures, the 
Japanese government constantly complained, but Park Geun-hye government 
strongly rejected.12 As the public opinion worsened, the president took an interest 
                                                  
12 For example, Japanese government requested for lifting of Korea’s import regulations at 
the Korea-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting in September 2013, however, Korean 
government rejected because it was a preventive and tentative step that was inevitably taken 
by spreading public fear and decreasing sales. 
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and took active action, reducing the ambiguity of policy goals.
   According to the World Health Organization’s Health Risk Assessment 
report at the time, cancer risks in other countries were not expected to increase 
significantly after the Fukushima accident, but increased in certain age and gender 
of residents near Fukushima prefecture (Codex Alimentarius Commission, 2013: 2). 
This is based on the possibility of radioactive contamination of the sea and marine 
products after Fukushima nuclear accident. If there was a possibility of radioactive 
contamination in fish products, it was persuasive to argue that there was no reason 
to delay strong import control for the sake of scientific uncertainty, as it was 
appropriate not to import them. Korea, in particular, was at great risk due to its 
close proximity to Japan and the high volume of trade in marine products with 
Japan (Ryu, 2015: 267).
   Park Geun-hye government formed ‘experts’ committee of radiation safety 
management’ twice in order to justify temporary special measures, and reviewed a 
report on the results provided by Japan. In addition, a group to conduct local survey 
was sent to Japan which inspected the status of safety management by visiting 
Japan’s fisheries wholesale and private inspection agencies, government agencies, 
local government, and consumer groups.
   In September 2014, when temporary special measures were taken one year 
later, six related ministries (Ministry of agriculture, food and rural affairs, Ministry 
of trade, industry, and energy, Ministry of food and drug safety, Ministry of foreign 
affairs, Nuclear safety and security commission, Ministry of ocean and fisheries) 
announced that this measure could be taken under the SPS Agreement. Therefore,
the need for a rational review of scientific feasibility arose (Related ministries, 
2014.09.15.). They announced that the government would conduct a new review in 
January 2015 with a plan for a second local investigation. The temporary measures 
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were positive in that they eased people’s anxiety about food safety. However, 
WTO dispute settlement process worked against the Korean government as shown 
in the following section in that this measure didn’t follow the official risk 
management procedure and was only decided by the ministers’ meeting.13
2. High-level of conflict
In this period, external conflicts as well as internal conflicts occurred. 
Externally, conflicts arose as Japan protested against Korea’s strong actions14, and 
internally, conflicts between government and consumers were prominent.
   The temporary special measures further worsened Korea-Japan relation. 
Since the inauguration of Park Geun-hye government, the Korea-Japan summit did 
not take place until May, 2015 because the president was pro-China and anti-Japan. 
Strong import ban in this political context caused friction with Japan. 
   Meanwhile, conflict among government ministries was not ostensibly 
revealed, but the different policy goals and means pursued by each ministry have 
increased the conflict. This was caused by the lack of coordination needed to bring 
                                                  
13 According to Article 24.1 of Korea Oceanic and Marine Disease Control Act, “the 
importation of designated quarantine materials produced or shipped in or through the region 
designated by Ministry of ocean and fisheries” is prohibited. And under Article 26.1 of the 
enforcement rules of same Act, the Minister of ocean and fisheries will report the import 
ban region. However, Korea’s measure on September 6, 2013 did not take steps that 
Minister of ocean and fisheries designates eight prefectures as import ban region, following 
the Article 24.1.1 and the enforcement rules of same Act 26.1. Instead, it was a strong 
temporary special measures because it was decided after a meeting of related ministers and 
consultations between government and ruling party. This appears to have been 
government’s strategic move to minimize trade friction with Japan by clarifying that the 
measure was a temporary measure under Article 5 of the SPS Agreement (Jeong and Jang, 
2015, 26-27).
14 According to an interview with an official at Ministry of trade, Japan asked Korean 
government to discuss lifting the import ban on fisheries products by using Korea-Japan 
Fisheries Agreement as a bargaining chip because Japan could become a radioactive 
country if Japan complaints to WTO. He said that if Korea accepts the bargaining chip, 
Korean government may appear to be taking a step back to the public, so turned down the 
deal.
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together goals among ministries. Office for government policy coordination with 
focus on public opinion led the temporary special measures because it was 
important to secure public confidence through the presentation of strong policies. 
Ministry of food and drug safety also announced that they had set up a new 
inspection center to strengthen inspection of imported marine products and planned 
to conduct a local survey in Japan (Ministry of food and drug safety, 2013.10.31.). 
Ministry of agriculture, food and rural affair also kept disclosing the result of 
radiation safety and announced that all domestic agricultural products must comply 
with the safety standards (Yoon, 2013).
   Public opinion in Korea worsened since Japan’s announcement of a
radioactive water leak. When Prime Minister Chung Hong-won ordered 
punishment of those who spread rumors (Hwang, 2013), six ministries under the 
Prime Minister announced a ban on all imports of Japanese marine products in 
September, 2013. They took strong measures focusing on appeasing public opinion. 
However, right after the announcement of its implementation, there was a great 
controversy as the Minister of ocean and fisheries said that there was no problem 
with the existing import ban from a scientific standpoint (Ministry of ocean and 
fisheries, 2013.09.11.). Furthermore, Ministry of ocean and fisheries hesitated the 
temporary special measures, claiming that Korea’s radiation detection standards are 
the strictest in the world (Ministry of ocean and fisheries, 2013.09.11.).
   In August, 2013, Nuclear safety and security commission sent a PhD 
researcher from the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) to Japan until the 
problem of radioactive contaminated water was solved (Nuclear safety and security 
commission, 2013.08.29.). The on-site activities ended in December, 2013, only 
four months after they started. It was because the situation was over. Since then, 
there have been no Korean experts in Japan, and we have come to rely on the data 
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provided by the Japanese government (Kim, 2014). In October of that year, the 
commission announced that no artificial radioactive materials had been detected in 
the seawater testing of areas expected to have been affected by the Fukushima 
plant.15 It was a surprise announcement because the temporary special measures 
was made just a month ago.
   Meanwhile, a committee of radioactive pollution civilian experts conducted 
a local survey in Japan twice in December, 2014 and January, 2015.16 It was 
aimed at easing public anxiety through closer investigation as a field investigation 
activity. However, the conflict erupted after media report that an official in 
Ministry of foreign affairs insisted lifting the provisional import ban during the 
committee’s second local investigation in January, 15. The reason was that Korea-
Japan relations should be normalized on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of 
diplomatic relations and that Korean actions could be filed with WTO due to 
possible violation of the trade law (Kim and Kim, 2015; Lee, 2015).17
   As food safety management system became publicized through opinions 
from other ministries other than the responsible ministry, this non-official channels 
                                                  
15 Four sites in East China Sea and two sites in nearby Ulleungdo Island under the 
influence of Fukushima power plant were not detected artificial radioactive materials. And 
the results of environmental radiation measurement also maintained the normal (Nuclear 
safety and security commission, 2013.10.04.).
16 The first local survey (December 14-19, 2014) examined the comprehensive measures of 
Japanese government’s marine products, including the status of radiation measurement 
results, radioactive contamination water management and preventive management. In 
second local survey (January 12, 2015), they visited Japan to check the status of 
distribution of marine products, private inspection agencies, and government agencies, and 
examine radioactive certification and management status of fishing area (Jung and Jang, 
2015: 12).
17 In the absence of the results of the investigation, as the argument of the official became 
controversy, a ministry official explained that there is no decision yet. “Ministry of foreign 
affairs seems impatient for resolving relations with Japan, and it will not be effective in 
improving relations with Japan because they already represented the lifting of import ban,” 
a government official said (Kim, 2015).
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other than official decision-making channels raised criticism of the radioactive 
contamination management system that should be operated on scientific basis 
(Jeong and Jang, 2015, 13). Conflicts between ministries were not only because 
they had different priorities for policy goals, but they preferred different means to 
achieve the policy goal of national health and safety.
  Conflicts between government and consumers stem from consumer distrust 
and discontent with the government. Despite government’s announcement, many 
consumers, who lost confidence in the government’s response and quarantine
system, called for an all-out ban on imports of Japanese marine products (Kim, 
2013). However, consumers had become distrustful of government as there was 
movement to lift the import ban under the insufficient public suspicion over 
Japanese fisheries products. 46 labor, citizen, religion, women, environment and 
human rights groups issued statements urging the government not to lift import 
restrictions, and public criticism spreaded on the Internet and social networks.
   Ministry of food and drug safety began to consider lifting the provisional 
import ban on Japanese fisheries products on the basis of the data provided by 
Japan in September, 2014. However, as media and consumer groups raised their 
voices of concern, government made an explanation that it was organizing a private 
expert committee for reviewing temporary import bans (related ministries, 
2014.09.15.). After a media reporting such government activity, the government 
hurriedly announced that it was only a meeting to form a civilian expert committee 
as a precursor, rather than lifting the import ban (Lee, 2014; Jung and Jang, 2015:
11-12). Accurate information provision and communication are important in crisis 
management, but as neither was met properly, the level of conflict between 
government and consumers was even higher. 
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3.3 Symbolic implementation: after June, 2015
Japan requested Korea to lift import restrictions as soon as possible, and 
continued to demand disclosure of information on whether Korea’s measures are 
compatible with the international standards. As Park Geun-hye government was 
continuously unresponsive, the Japanese government requested for bilateral talk in 
Korea according to the WTO dispute settlement procedures. However, the talk 
ended after confirming the differences between the two sides. Japan claimed that 
Korea’s actions were neither transparent nor based on scientific evidence, thus 
violating the SPS Agreement.18 As the Japanese government requested the WTO 
dispute settlement system to set up a panel on August 20, the panel was organized 
on September 28 and, the Korea-Japan dispute entered a new phase.19 Meanwhile, 
the Japanese government continuously expressed concern and regret over measures 
to regulate imports of marine products whenever Korea and Japan met in minister’s
meeting or committee of economy gatherings between Korea and Japan. Park 
Geun-hye government, however, refused to withdraw import bans, sticking to its 
original position of responding to the dispute settlement system. 
   In the end, the Korean government lost the first trial. WTO panel saw the 
                                                  
18 In response to Japanese government’s claim, Korea government raised the following 
objections. First, the footnote in Annex 1 of the SPS Agreement (Definition) defines 
‘contaminants’ as “including residues and external substances of pesticides and veterinary 
drugs”. Therefore, radioactive materials, which are concerned to be contained in eight 
prefectures near Fukushima, are considered ‘contaminants’. Second, ‘sanitary or plant 
sanitation measures’ as defined by the SPS Agreement means “protection of any human or 
animal life or health within the territory from the risk of additive, contaminants, toxins or 
disease causes in food”. Thus, the temporary ban taken by Korean government is consistent 
with the purpose of protecting the lives or health of humans or animals in Korean territory 
from the risks that could arise from radioactive materials.
19 The composition of the panel was completed on 8 February, 2016. The panel, which 
started its first oral hearing in July of the same year, distributed the panel report to Korea, 
Japan and other member countries as third-party rights on October 16, the following year. 
The final panel report was circulated and released to WTO member countries on 22 
February, 2018 (WT/DS495).
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Korean government’s ban on imports of Japanese marine products in 2011 and 
2013 as a legitimate measure, but what was maintained after was in violation of 
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement on temporary measure. The Korean government 
did not take steps to maintain the provisional measure of four requirements 
required by the clause. In other words, the government did not take steps to collect 
additional necessary information for a more objective risk assessment and to 
review the provisional measures within a reasonable period.20 They also judged 
that the Korean government’s actions were arbitrary and unjustly utilized, thus 
discriminating against Japanese marine products and limiting trade more than 
necessary (in violation of Article 2 of the Agreement). In other words, even though 
Korea could achieve the proper level of protection only through the cesium test, 
requiring additional inspections is more than necessary. It also judged that Article 7 
of the Agreement (Transparency) was violated because the items of import ban 
were not specifically stated on the Korean government homepage21 and they did 
not properly provided the information that the Japanese government requested for 
the second time (’14.11.13.) (WT/DS495).
   The theoretical model used this study shows the characteristics of symbolic 
implementation when ambiguity and conflict levels are high at the same time. 
Symbolic implementation is mainly done in the process of maturing new policy 
goals, reaffirming existing policy goals, or exploring important values and 
                                                  
20 The panel accepted Japanese government’s claim and judged that Korean government’s 
2011 measure was based on information that existed at the time, but the 2013 measures 
violated scientific basis requirements by not doing so. It also ruled that although Korean 
government announced they would review in 2014, they did not implement it, and there 
was no record of taking specific action and no reasonable reason for the delay.
21 According to a panel report, Korean government ‘simply’ stopped providing data. Why 
did this happen? Unfortunately, the panel couldn’t search the website of Ministry of food 
and drug safety because they stopped operation for a while due to suggestions on renewing 
its website during the period of parliamentary inspection (Interview of former official in 
Ministry of trade, industry and energy).
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principles (Jeong, 2005). The implementation in this period illustrates this 
characteristic. With the advent of a new variable about WTO complaint, the 
Korean government reeled from the Japanese challenge on imports ban. When no 
ministry showed intent to solve problems or show leadership, there was also 
directive goal ambiguity and evaluative goal ambiguity. These government 
responses led to greater public distrust and increased internal conflicts. Still, by 
maintaining the existing import ban, the conflict with Japan only escalated and 
eventually no one could be satisfied. As such, the first trial was expected to lose. 
However, the first trial outcome was overturned on April 11 2019, breaking 
everyone’s expectations. This has never happened in the SPS Agreement dispute. 
The WTO judged that Korea’s import ban is neither arbitrary discrimination nor 
unfair trade restrictions. It is a reversal of the dispute settlement’s decision. The 
same argument was rejected in the first trial and accepted in the final trial. So Why 
did the dispute, which could have been won in the first trail, continue unending?
1. High-level of goal ambiguity: directive goal ambiguity and 
evaluative goal ambiguity
Although Korea-Japan fisheries dispute entered a new phase due to Japan’s 
complaint to WTO, the Korean government did not take any special actions except 
minimal steps in the dispute settlement system. After Japan’s complaint, there was 
no movement by the Blue House. As no action was taken by the Blue House, there 
was a directive goal ambiguity among government ministries that did not know 
what to do, and it led to policy drift. After Japan’s complaint was announced, 
Ministry of trade, industry and energy made a passive response such as some delay 
in organizing WTO dispute panel (Kim, 2015; Yoo, 2015). In addition, existing 
research activities were stopped for reasons that were not obvious. Above all, 
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Japan’s radioactive contamination situation and food radioactive material 
management information had to be used as scientific basis for Korea’s analysis, but 
no official government report had been released.22
   The Korean government’s action contrasts with the Institut de 
Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire in France and Vienna Technology 
University in Austria that continuously released Japan’s radioactive contamination 
monitoring. Of course, it is not always appropriate to take new measures after the 
dispute settlement process has begun, but the panel report shows how weak the 
Korean government’s response was during this period. Until earlier periods, 
Ministry of food and drug safety had been in charge about this situation. However, 
when the Blue House and Office for government policy coordination paced up and 
down after the WTO complaint, even Ministry of foreign affairs and Ministry of 
trade, industry and energy had to come up with a strategy, but no one came up with 
proper measures with the increasing directive goal ambiguity within the 
government ministries.
   As the panel report revealed, the Korean government’s poor response was 
due to its huge evaluative goal ambiguity during this period. It is well seen that the 
Korean government has taken measures to deal with various legal issues, not only 
before the complaint but also after.
                                                  
22 “The role of the committee was to reassess the validity of import regulations, and 
government’s strong regulations in the first place was because of the impact of public 
opinion.” Said a member of the committee. He also argued that the civil committee’s 
activities have been suspended indefinitely as Japan filed a complaint WTO without prior 
notice to Korea. According to Song Ki-ho (2016), as Japanese government filed a complaint
to WTO, the civil committee held on June 5, 2015 decided to postpone submitting the 
report and watch WTO action. In addition, the committee initially planned to collect not 
only surface water but also undersea soil and deep water by doing local survey, but 
withdrew the survey in response to Japan’s objection of as excessive survey. Although the 
purpose of the investigation was to find out about radioactive contamination of marine 
products and the leakage of Fukushima nuclear power plant water, the committee just 
withdrew it. In the end, they missed an opportunity to secure data that can be used as 
decisive evidence during investigation of WTO panel.
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   First, for Korea to effectively respond to the dispute, it had to provide 
grounds for temporary special measures to be in accordance with Article 5 of the 
SPS Agreement. For Korea to maintain its import ban, it should have made efforts 
to collect additional information through objective risk assessments and to review 
its interim measures within a reasonable period. However, according to a document 
submitted to WTO by U.S., which participated in the dispute settlement system as 
third-party rights on August 2, 2016, the Korean government did not even properly 
claim Article 5.7 as the basic clause (WT/DS495). Also, as mentioned earlier, the 
Korean government suddenly stopped working on the civil expert committee. The 
survey of deep water and undersea soil, which could be the basis of rebuttal to 
Japan’s claim, was not finished in response to the request by Japan. In addition, the 
failure to disclose the results of the survey would not provide a basis for 
maintaining the provisional measure.
   Second, the most controversial issue in the case of fisheries dispute between 
Korea and Japan over the interpretation and application of Article 2 of the SPS 
Agreement, which bans the disguised restriction on trade through arbitrary or 
unjust discrimination, was that the additional inspection was only taken by the 
Korean government. As mentioned earlier, even though China and Taiwan have 
taken stronger measures than Korea, including banning imports of all food products 
from 10 and 5 prefectures respectively, Korea was the only country that required 
additional inspections. This was also the result of excessive measures taken without 
clear evaluation criteria and rationale.
   After WTO panel’s defeat in February 2018, the Korean government sought 
to maintain its existing measures rather than take immediate action under the WTO 
ruling amid growing anxiety over Japanese fisheries products. The government 
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also decided to file an appeal.23 On April 11, 2019, the WTO ruled in favor of 
South Korea, reversing the first trial decision. The government was quick to 
schedule an official announcement because it was an unexpected result.24
2. High-level of conflict
Even up to the moment this paper is being written, public anxiety over 
radioactive marine products has not been resolved. Although the Japanese 
government and Tokyo Electric Power Corporation have come up with various 
measures to prevent the leakage of contaminated water out of the nuclear power 
plant since September 2013, the contaminated water from the power plant is still 
flowing out. There are predictions that it will take more than 10 years for the 
problem to be finally resolved. In addition, Korean public’s distrust of the Korean 
government, which had been sued by Japan without taking any action, has 
intensified (Jeong and Jang, 2015: 66).
   The confrontation between Korea and Japan through dispute settlement 
procedures was also an extension of international conflicts.
   First, Korea and Japan were at odds over the responsibility of proof under 
Article 5 of the Agreement. Under this provision, the responsibility of proof is on 
the country filing an appeal. The Korean government argued that although Japan 
did not file a complaint against Article 5.7, it was responsible for prima facie 
                                                  
23 According to a joint ministries’ press release on February 23, 2018, Korean government 
decided to take as follows, saying “public health and safety first”: (1) The government is in 
the position that there is a problem with the panel decision, and will raise an appeal 
according to WTO dispute settlement procedure to fight this issue, (2) Regardless of the 
results of this panel decision, existing import regulations remain in place until the end of 
the dispute settlement procedure, (3) Prepare the appeal thoroughly and make every effort 
to prevent any radioactive food from being on our table. 
24 The government insisted on a background briefing without a broadcasting camera, but 
belatedly switched to an official briefing when news of the victory was made. Yoon Chang-
ryul, head of the Social Policy Coordination Office at the office for Government Policy 
Coordination, said “We prepared a statement to prepare for the defeat.”(Jung and Choi, 
2019).
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evidence that Korea’s actions were consistent with the Article 5.7. However, Japan 
insisted that it was the responsibility of the applicant, so Korea has to take 
responsibility. After all, panel decided that Korea has the onus of proof. 
   Second, the four requirements for provisional measures should be met on a 
cumulative basis. The Japanese government concentrated on the fact that the 
Korean government’s action did not have sufficient scientific basis, such as not 
utilizing information available at that time. In the end, the panel accepted Japan’s 
claim and judged that Korea’s actions failed to meet the requirements of the first 
two of the four requirements: (1) Measures introduced when relevant scientific 
evidence is lacking, (2) Action based on appropriate information available.
   Third, the Korean government admitted that the import ban was 
discriminatory, but insisted that it was a legitimate measure to protect the health of 
the public because of the insufficient scientific evidence against the dangers of 
Japanese fisheries products. However, the panel judged that Korea’s import ban 
and other additional inspection measures are too strong in terms of trade 
restrictions. The panel ruled that it is self-indulgent and unjustifiable because 
Korea did not implement the scientific risk assessment even though it was possible.
   Fourth, the Korean government claimed that it posted the import ban 
through its website and media reports, and it had responded to Japan’s two 
inquiries by setting up enquiries. On the other hand, Japan claimed that Korea’s 
actions violated its obligations to publish properly and to provide answers and data 
through enquiries under Article 7 of the SPS Agreement and Annex B (1) and B (3). 
Panel judged that Korea violated Annex B (1) and B (3). Even if Korea disclosed 
the full import ban on violations about B (1) on its website, it did not specify the 
items under the import ban, and the additional test requirements were not enough 
for stakeholders including Japan to recognize any changes in the conditions. 
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Although Korea did not complete its answer to Japan’s first request (’14.06.24.), it 
could not be said to be a violation of B (3) in that it had been trying to set up 
enquiries. However, the panel judged it was a violation of the second request 
(’14.11.13.) because the Korean government did not answer ‘simply’ and did not 
provide appropriate data. 
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Chapter 4. Conclusion and Policy Implications
The study analyzed the Korea and Japan fisheries dispute using the ambiguity-
conflict theory. After the March 11, 2011 earthquake in Japan, the Korean 
government’s import ban of Japanese fisheries was implemented in three major 
steps, depending on the degree of ambiguity of policy objectives and conflicts 
among stakeholders. The major events that played an important role in changing 
the goals of ambiguity and policy means were Japan’s announcement of leakage of 
radioactive water in July, 2013 and Japan’s complaint to WTO in June, 2015. 
   First, until the Japan’s issue of contaminated water leaks became 
controversial (March, 2011 ~ July, 2013), the Korean government did not 
understand the severity of the public health and safety crisis caused by radioactive 
marine products, which quickly turned out to be ambiguous. There was no major 
conflict domestically and abroad. This period was considered as a semi-
experimental implementation in that it showed some characteristics of 
experimental implementation but did not have sufficient policy learning that is 
usually shown in experimental implementation.
   Second, the public sentiment erupted after Japan’s massive spill of 
radioactive water into the sea, with the Korean government announcing temporary 
measures to impose a total ban on all marine products in eight prefectures in Japan. 
During this period (July, 2013 ~ May, 2015), the Korean government clearly 
recognized the goal of protecting the public health and safety, but there were 
internal discords between ministries, and external conflicts with Japan. Therefore, 
this period was characterized by political implementation.
   Third, the period since June, 2015 shows the characteristic of symbolic 
implementation. Japan claimed that the Korean government’s measures about 
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import ban on 28 kinds of marine products in eight prefectures and additional 
inspection certificates are breach of the obligations of the SPS Agreement. The 
Korean government stuck to the import ban due to public opinion gripped by 
radioactive fears, but did not actively respond to the WTO complaint. In February, 
2018, the WTO panel ruled that the Korean government’s import ban violated the 
provisions of Article 2.3 (discrimination), Article 5.6 (more trade restrictive than 
required), and Article 7 and Annex 2 (Transparency). The Korean government filed 
the appeal after the ruling. And in April 2019, a decision was made to overturn the 
first trial ruling for the first time in the history of the SPS dispute. It was an 
unexpected result. The government’s mishandling of the case can be seen as failing 
to settle the dispute that could have been won in the first place.
The defeat of the Korean government in the first trial was foreseeable. The 
Korean government did not fully understand the SPS Agreement and the 
international standards, and took no considerable action regarding the insufficient 
information at hand. In response, public distrust and diplomatic conflicts 
intensified. Although related ministries should have discussed the issue head-to-
head, the implementation process of the import ban showed the tendency of having 
different purposes while working together. The import ban of marine products 
passed through experimental and political implementation processes, and finally 
drifted toward a symbolic implementation. In the first and third period, the 
government’s position was not established, and policy goals were blurred. In the 
second period, when the policy goal was relatively clear, the policy showed signs 
of drift due to differences in perceptions among related ministries, government-
public, and Korea-Japan relations over specific policy means. Such a policy drift, 
or the lack of consistency provided a pretext for Japan to make Korea the sole 
target of complaint among several countries that have banned imports of Japanese 
38
fisheries products. The Korean government also failed to come up with 
comprehensive measures at the government level due to the lack of understanding 
of SPS Agreement, radioactive contaminated food and differences in awareness 
among ministries. This was why the dispute, which could have been won in the 
first trial, was not over.
   As discussed above, understanding the Korea-Japan marine product dispute 
and the WTO dispute panel decision has very important policy implications. 
   First, WTO’s SPS Agreement aims to protect the public’s food safety and 
the environment. As with the technical barriers to goods, however, hygiene and 
quarantine measures on food and plants in each country since the 1980s have been 
seen to protect domestic agriculture and livestock industries by restricting imports 
of foods and plants. In response, WTO has applied the criteria to discipline these 
measures by each country so that they do not become protective trade measures. 
However, critics say that the SPS deal is too dependent on science and technology. 
We should not abandon scientificism unilaterally, but that the justification for the 
SPS measure should not be overly imbued with science. For example, demanding 
too much scientificism in countries with a large number of agricultural and marine 
imports, such as Korea, can prevent people from maintaining their health and 
stability. In the end, it is important to secure expertise in this regard as this will be 
supplemented through the case of dispute settlement system (Goo and Choi, 2019).
   Second, the main reason for the failure of Korea-Japan fisheries dispute in 
the first trial is because Korean government’s import ban was not based on a 
scientific risk assessment, which requires institutional and administrative 
supplementation. Finding sufficient scientific evidence and conducting a risk 
assessment requires systematic investment in the areas of sanitation, such as 
recruitment of experts and acquirement of advanced equipments. 
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   Third, Japan’s complaint against Korea’s ban on imports of marine 
products is the first case of SPS dispute over radioactive contaminated food. This 
made it difficult to prepare and the government was confused in the process. It is 
necessary to thoroughly study and prepare for the possible recurrence of such 
disputes. The panel’s decision confirmed that even a small part of policy 
implementation is disadvantageous in the process of litigation. Therefore, 
ministries need to expand the recognition and understanding of the WTO dispute 
settlement system and SPS Agreement. 
   Fourth, because all trade disputes require cooperation from various 
ministries, the leadership of some related ministries or experts is insufficient. It is 
also necessary to secure the trust and support of politicians, the media and provide 
the public with sufficient information. Korea, which suffered a national turmoil and 
a paralysis of state affairs in 2008 when the mad cow disease crisis hit the country 
a decade ago, should try to expand the people’s access to information services 
concerned with food safety. Furthermore, only when scientific inspection and the 
results are transparently disclosed, can the public support the government. 
Maintaining policy consistency and reducing confusion through this process will 
secure the public confidence in the government policies, and moreover, it will be 
able to build trust internationally. 
   Finally, this study is a single case study, and generalization of the 
conclusions reached in this paper is strictly limited. In order to test the veracity of 
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한일 수산물 WTO 분쟁 사례 연구





본 연구는 2011년 3월 동일본 원전사고 직후부터 한국 정부가 취한
일본산 수산물 수입금지조치와 그에 대한 일본 정부의 WTO 제소, 
2018년 2월 WTO 분쟁 패널의 1심 판정 결과, 그리고 한국 정부의 상
소와 2019년 4월 최종 판정 등에 걸친 과정을 정책집행론의 관점에서
재구성하여 분석한다. 무엇으로부터 누구를 왜 보호해야 하는지에 대한
뚜렷한 인식이 없는 상황에서 졸속으로 이루어진 한국 정부의 대응, 즉
일본산 수산물 금지조치는 초기부터 표류했고, 정책집행 과정의 고비 때
마다 불거진 이해당사자 간 갈등으로 인해 더욱 심화되었다. 비록 최종
심에서 극적으로 승소했지만, 1심에서 끝낼 수 있었던 분쟁이 왜 지속
되었는가에 대해 의문이 남는다. Richard Matland의 모호성-갈등 모형
을 통해 동 사례를 분석한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 방사능 오염 일본
산 수산물로부터 국민의 건강과 안전을 지켜야 할 한국 정부는 분쟁 과
정 내내 일관된 정책목표를 찾지 못했다. 둘째, 정책목표 표류 상황에서
50
일본과의 외교적 갈등은 물론 국내적으로 유관 중앙부처 간 갈등과 정부
-소비자 집단의 갈등이 나타났다. 결과적으로 지난 8여 년간 한국 정부
의 일본산 수산물 수입금지조치는 준실험적 집행 → 정치적 집행 → 상
징적 집행의 표류 과정을 거쳤다. 1심에서 한국 정부의 패소는 예견된
사태였다. 한국 정부는 국제규범을 제대로 이해하지 못했으며, 정책 학
습의 기회를 스스로 차버렸다. 문제해결을 위해 유관 부처가 머리를 맞
대고 논의를 했어야 하지만 수입금지조치라는 정책 집행 과정에서는 동
상이몽의 전형을 보여주었다. 끝으로 본 연구는 향후 한일 수산물 WTO 
분쟁과 유사 사례에 대처하기 위한 정책적 시사점을 도출한다.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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